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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - SALES, BULK SALES,
AND DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
PAUL

D.

CARRINGTON*

Article 2-Sales
This Article of the Uniform Commercial Code is a revision and
amplification of the Uniform Sales Act, which was adopted in Wyoming
in 1917.' The Sales Act was, in its time, a useful piece of legislation, but
the merchants, lawyers, and scholars most concerned with it have been
dissatisfied for many years. They have expressed two principal criticisms:
first, that the Uniform Sales Act left too much unsaid and unsettled and,
second, that it was too conceptualistic in approach, requiring that too many
problems be solved by reference to metaphysical considerations rather than
the justice or practicality of results. Despite the superificial simplicity of
the Sales Act, the justice of these criticisms is apparent to all but the most
uncritical observers. 2 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are
therefore justified in making an effort to improve their handiwork.
Draftsmanship and Legislative Technique
The difference in the technique and diction of the Uniform Commercial Code is perhaps best and most importantly exemplified in the
eclipse of the presently vital concept of "title to goods." Title is obviously
a useful shorthand description of the rights and risks which are conferred
upon the person possessing it, but the common law and the Uniform Sales
Act have long employed the concept not only as a description, but as a
determinant of those rights and risks. This is so despite the obvious
artificiality of the concept and the circular analysis which results: risk
of loss depends on title and title is (in simple fact) in the party who bears
the risk of loss. The Uniform Sales Act did break loose from this verbal
prison to declare that passage of title is determined by the intent of the
parties and to establish some rules for divining their intent from the terms
of their transactions.3 But these rules are, again, highly artificial in that
only a lawyer would ever pause to form an intent as to when title should
pass to the buyer of goods. Thus, despite the efforts expended in trying
to determine the intent of the parties in accordance with the rules of the
Uniform Sales Act, title has remained an elusive spectre. Furthermore, the
effort to be consistent, to give title the same meaning in default cases, for
instance, that it is given in risk of loss cases, has led to some peculiar and
unsatisfactory results. For these reasons, the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code elected to curtail the significance of title and to provide
'Assistant Professor of Law, University of Indiana, formerly of the University of Wyoming.
This paper is a chapter of a report to the Legislative Research Committee of the
Wyoming legislature. See 14 Wyoming L. J. 198 for another chapter from the report.
None of the views expressed here are indorsed by the members of the Committee.
1. WS 34-157 et seq.
2. Professor Williston, who drafted the Uniform Sales Act, was one; but he is not
uncritical of the Code. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform'
Commercial Code, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1950).
3. Uniform Sales Act § 19, WS 34-184.
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different rules for the different problems heretofore resolved by reference
4
to that concept.
It would perhaps be easy to exaggerate the importance of this change.
It should first be observed that title is preserved, without significant change,
for the purpose of determining problems not otherwise solved by the
Uniform Commercial Code, such as matters of state taxation or trade
regulation. 5 Also, it is true that there are not man) cases where title has
proved an unduly rigid concept. The principal advantage claimed by the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code is that the same results will be
reached with less jousting of windmills; this would be a salutary saving of
effort and it would doubtless result from adoption of the Code. The
nature and significance of this improvement is typical of the effect of the
Uniform Commercial Code on existing sales law; most of the changes, like
this one, are technical simplifications of method, intended to ease lawyers
and litigants over the rough spots disclosed by a half century of experience
with sales legislation.
This same objective is also served by the introduction of a few new
concepts; typical of these is a distinction sometimes made on the basis of
whether the party involved is a "merchant." 6 This is not an artificial
distinction but is based upon a fact of independent significance: the occupation of the seller or buyer. It is also a necessary distinction. It is obvious
that considerations of mercantile convenience are of more importance in
transactions between merchants and that considerations of fairness are of
greater importance in transactions involving a housewife-consumer; some
rules, if applied indiscriminately to both classes of transactions, are likely to
produce some inconvenience for the merchant or some unfairness to the
housewife. Only by making the distinction is it possible to give maximum
effect to considerations both of fairness and of practicality. One may surmise that the failure of the existing law to make this distinction has
probably caused some warped and erratic applications of statutory provisions which are not equally well-suited to the merchant or the housewife; thus reognition of the distinction will probably bring an additional
advantage in permitting greater certainty of application of the rules
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Undoubtedly more important than this change in the technique of
problem solution is the change which the Code offers to make in the
quality of the draftsmanship of our sales law. Because the drafters of
Code were able to benefit from our experience with the Uniform Sales
4.

5.
6.

See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-508, 2-709, 2-722; for a more complete
defense of the Code approach. see Latty, Sales and Title and The Proposed Code,
16 Law & Contemp, Prob. 3 (1951). Note, The Passage of Title, 14 Wyo. L. J. 25
(1959).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401. See Hercules Powder Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 66 Wyo. 268, 208 P.2d 1096 (1949) ; Russell v. Walter Schultz Wholesale Grocery Co., 51 Wyo. 125, 64 P.2d 610 (1936).
Uniform Commercial Code 1 2-106.
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Act, and because they were able to devote much more manpower to the
project of drafting, they have produced a much more thorough piece of
legislation. The Uniform Commercial Code would fill countless gaps
which have appeared in the present law and would afford us a clarity of
expression which we cannot now enjoy.
Much of what has been said can be demonstrated by a comparison of
the present Wyoming statutes pertaining to bona fide purchasers of goods
with the comparable Uniform Commercial Code provision.7 Several
significant differences between the two statutes can be readily observed.
Subsection (1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provision rephrases the
7.

USA § 23 (WS 34-187). Sale by a
person not the owner. (1) Subject to
the provisions of this Act [§§ 34-157 to
34-235] where goods are sold by a
person who is not the owner thereof,
and who does not sell them under the
authority or with the consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better
title to the goods than the seller had,
unless the owner of the goods is by his
conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.
(2) Nothing in this Act, however
shall affect:
ac(a) The provisions of any factors'
acts, recording acts, or any enactment
enabling the apparent owner of goods
to dispose of them as if he were the
true owner thereof;
(b) The validity of any contract to
sell or sale under any special common
law or statutory power of sale or
under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
USA § (WS 34-188). Sale by one
having a voidable title. Where the
seller of goods has a voidable title
thereto, but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, the
buyer acquires a good title to the
goods, provided he buys them in good
faith, for value, and without notice of
the seller's defect of title.
USA § 25 (WS 34-189).
Sale by
seller in possession of goods already
sold. Where a person having sold goods
continues in possession of the goods,
or of negotiable documents of title to
the goods, the delivery or transfer by
that person, or by an agent acting for
him, of the goods or documents of title
under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same in
good faith and without notice of the
previous sale, shall have the same effect
as if the person making the delivery
or transfer were expressly authorized
by the owner of the goods to make
the same.

UCC 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good
Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting."
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all
title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest
purchased. A person with voidable title
has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When
goods have been delivered under the
transaction of purchase the purchaser
has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as
to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange
for a check which is later dishonored,
or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction
was to be a "cash sale" or
(d) the delivery w a s procured
through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of
goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescense in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to
the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of
the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as
to be larcenous under the criminal
law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers
of goods and of lien creditors are
governed by the Articles on Secured
Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of
Ttile (Article 7).
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old' sections 23 and 24 of the Uniform Sales Act clearly and tersely and
then adds new material to cover several situations which are troublesome
and subject to dotibt under existing law. Subsection (2) is a simplification of the old section 25 and Subsection (3) makes it clear that this
simplification is intended to sweep aside a number of useless technicalities
which have arisen to plague our present statute, such as the distinction
favoring the right of unpaid sellers in a "cash sale" to reclaim the goods
even in the hands of a later bona fide purchaser," and the distinction
between larceny by trick and civil fraud which has sometimes been imported into sales law to protect the same unpaid seller.9 Also abolished
are the technical limitations which are necessitated by the narrow language
of our present section 25, which require, for instance, that the seller-bailee
must have continuous possession of the goods from the time of his first
sale or the second buyer cannot be protected.1 0 This Section of the
Uniform Commercial Code does make a minor change in the existing law
by affording somewhat greater protection for fewer third-party purchasers.
The reasoning of the drafters of the Code is clearly explained in the
Official Comment:
The older loose concept of good faith and wide definition of value
combined to create apparent good faith purchasers in many situations in which the result outraged common sense; the court's solution was to protect the original title especially by use of "cash
sale" or of over-technical construction of the enabling clauses of
the statutes. But such rulings then turned into limitations on the
proper protection of buyers in the ordinary market. [The Code
definition] cuts down the category of buyer in the ordinary course
in such fashion as to take care of the results of the cases, but with
no price either in confusion or in injustice to proper dealings in
the normal market."
This comparison of the two statutes is thus further evidence of what
has perhaps already been adequately demonstrated: despite first impressions, the Code is not a revolutionary statute, but is merely a thorough,
careful re-working of the present statutes to bring greater certainty,
simplicity and fairness to our commercial laws. Most of the Code and
especially of Article 2, compares with the existing law in much the way
that these statutes compared. We will now proceed to consider in more
detail the changes which were wrought by Article 2, but a complete understanding requires that the reader keep the perspective-these changes are
but a lesser adjunct -to the greater achievement of greatly improved
draftsmanship.
Formalities of the Sales Contract
Part '2 of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code would make a
8.
9.
10.
11.

E.g., Amols v. Berstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y. Supp. 518 (1st Dept., 1925)
(alternative holding).
E.g., Amols v. Bernstein, supra note 8 (alternative holding).
Kelley v. Ness, 182 Or. 661, 189 P.2d 570 (1948); Goad v. Wellendorf, 67 Colo. 40,
185 Pac. 470 (1919).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403, Comment 3.
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number of significant changes in the existing technical rules pertaining
to the form, formation and readjustment of the sales contract. In general,
these changes are intended to liberalize the present law by removing the
more cumbersome technicalities and providing for results which more
nearly conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to commercial transactions.
Several significant changes are made in the Statute of Frauds provisions relaing to contracts for the sale of goods. The most important of
these changes would raise the minimum contract price needed to bring a
sale within the Statute and thus make the requirement of a writing operative. The present minimum is $50;12 the Code would raise this to $500.13
This is clearly a desirable change. Almost never will the parties to a small
sale think it necessary or desirable to reduce their agreement to writing
and the Statute of Frauds is, in such instances, much more likely to serve
as an instrument of fraud than as an inhibition of it. The Code would also
liberalize the requirements as to the sufficiency of a memorandum of
sale which is offered as a compliance with the Statute. Although the
Uniform Sales Act is silent as to what is required in the way of a written
memorandum, our Supreme Court has said that it "must contain in substantial terms the contract so that it cannot be misunderstood or confused
with some other writing to which it refers, without resort to parol evidence:
and such that one paper cannot be substituted for another." 14 Such a
measure of detail in the written memorandum is much more than is needed
to serve the purposes of the Statute and can make the Statute a very tough
trap for the merchant who neglects to include a single term of the agreement in the memorandum. The Code expressly provides that there need
be only a "writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties .
"15
1.
This is limited in some measure by the
further provision that the contract shall not be enforceable beyond the
quantity of goods indicated in the writing. And also the Uniform Commercial Code would alter the effect of a partial performance of an unwritten contract. Under the existing statute, a partial performance removes
the whole agreement from the application of the writing requirement.1 6 This
is somewhat irrational and the Code limits the effect to the extent of the
performance. Thus the contract becomes enforceable "with respect to
goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accep'ed."17
One other change in the Statute of Frauds also bears mention; it is
an example of the use of the new "merchant" concept previously described.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

WS 34-169.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201 (1).
Burley-Winter Pottery Co. v. Onken Bros. & West Co., 26 Wyo. 287, 291, 183 Pac.
747, 749 (1919) ; Noland v. Haywood, 46 Wyo. 101, 106, 23 P,2d 845, 846 (1933).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201 (1).
Saratoga Land & Investment Co. v. Jensen, 20 Wyo. 323, 125 Pac. 415 (1912).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201 (3) (c).
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Between merchants, failure to answer a written confirmation is made tantamount to acceptance of the terms of the confirmation18 and, consistently
with this provision, it is made tantamount to signing the confirmation for
the purpose of meeting the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 19 This
is a very wise change; it is certainly in accordwith general commercial
practice that a merchant should be privileged to expect a fellow tradesman
to speak up promptly if he intends to repudiate the contract as it is
described in the confirmation. The present contrary rule permits the
merchant receiving written confirmation of an oral agreement to repudiate
or accept the contract as it may suit his advantage at the time performance
is tendered. It is plainly unfair thus to have but one party committed to
the bargain. The change is one that is long overdue.
Aside from the Statute of Frauds provisions, this Part also includes a
number of other provisions which are largely declaratory of the common
law of contracts; these are intended primarily to afford a greater measure
of certainty in the law pertaining to the formation of the sales contract,
but a few changes are made to make the law also more amenable to commercial practice. The same provision which requires the merchant to
speak up if he objects to a provision of the written confirmation would
also liberalize the rules of offer and acceptance to take care of the situation
20
where both parties to a sales contract insist on using their own forms.
Under existing law, the use of slightly dissimilar forms will prevent the
formation of a contract, regardless of the expectations of the parties at the
time. It is said that there is no "meeting of the minds." The Uniform
Commercial Code makes the expression of acceptance binding, even though
it includes additional or different terms from those included in the offer.
The new terms are then treated as offers to modify the contract and, as
between merchants, these terms will become a part of the agreement unless
they materially alter it or the original offeror makes seasonable objection.
One change is made in the needlessly technical common law parol
evidence rule. Under existing case law, an "integrated" contract is presumed to be complete as to all matters agreed upon and the parties are not
permitted to prove the existence of additional terms.2 1 The Uniform
Commercial Code recognizes that buyers and sellers may sometimes make
a written agreement which is intended to be final as to the matters covered,
but which is not intended to be complete; it permits the parties to explain
or supplement the writing with "evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
22
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
18.
19.
20.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201 (2).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207. See also § 2-305, dealing with open price
terms, which liberalizes the rules of offer and acceptance with respect to the

21.
22.

requirement of definiteness.
Bushnell v. Elkins, 34 Wyo. 495, 246 Pac. 304 (1926).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202.

THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

Another change is made to mitigate the rigors of the common law
requirement of consideration. The rules of consideration are quite unsatisfactory as they are presently applied to deny effect to a communication
which is represented as a firm offer. The purpose of the consideration
requirement is to deny enforcement to promises which are ill-considered
gifts on the part of the promisor; this purpose is not served by denying
enforcement to the promise of a merchant to keep his offer open for a
limited period of time. The Code therefore provides that such a firm offer
is binding on a merchant if it is made in writing and the period of
23
irrevocability is limited to three months.

Another change which bears mention is concerned with oral modification or rescission of a written agreement; the existing law is that such a
modification is valid if not within the Statute of Frauds.2 4 This is probably
contrary to the expectations of most businessmen and affords a considerable danger of false claims of modification. The Uniform Commercial
Code provides additional protection against such claims by giving sanction
to a signed agreement which excludes unsigned modification or recission. 25
Finally, this Part of the Uniform Commercial Code wotjld reverse the
present presumption 26 that an assignment of a contract does not thereby
delegate the duty of performing it, unless the language or circumstances
indicate that this is the intent of the parties to the assignment. 2" This is
a wise change which brings the law into conformity with the expectations
of businessmen; the present rule is a trap for the unwary.
Obligations of Buyer and Seller
The provisions of the Uniform Sales Act dealing with the construction
of the sales contract are especially cryptic; for this reason, Part 3 of Article
2, dealing with the general obligation and construction of contracts contains a great deal of new material which is largely declaratory of the
existing case law. As examples, this Part includes entirely new provisions
dealing with output, requirements and exclusive dealing contracts, 28 with
options and the obligation of one party to cooperate with respect to the
performance of the other, 29 and with the definition of such important
and common terms as "FOB" s ° and "CIF."31

Also included is another

32
entirely new provision dealing with unconscionable contracts or clauses;

this section has been the subject of some controversy, but seems well

planned to serve a useful purpose.

Experience has proved that courts

confronted with the choice of making a warped construction of a contract
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205.
Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446 (1951).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209.
Williams v. McWhorter, 30 Wyo. 229, 218 Pac. 791 (1923).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-210.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-311.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-319.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-320.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302.
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or an applicable statute or else serving as an instrument of oppression or
unfair surprise to a party to a sales contract will almost always choose to
warp the language. The resulting decisions create doubt as to the meaning which will be attributed to the same language in the future and are
a source of uncertainty. The Uniform Commercial Code has solved this
problem by authorizing the courts to refuse enforcement of contracts or
clauses which they find to be unconscionable as a matter of law; this
permits the courts to be candid in refusing to oppress abused litigants
and saves the contract and statute from tortured construction. The disposition of courts to uphold the agreement being what it is, it is not to be
expected that the Code provision will itself prove to be a source of uncertainty, despite the obvious vagueness of the term employed. It seems
clear that the section cannot be used to disturb the allocation of risks
which may result from disparity of bargaining power, but will serve to
take care of situations where one party attempts to rely upon an apparent,
but unintended, meaning to escape his contract obligation. The Official
Comments to the Code 31 gives ten examples of cases decided under existing law which might have been handled more easily under the new unconscionable contract provision; one of these, which should suffice here, is
a Utah case 34 in which a clause limiting time for complaints was held
inapplicable to latent defects in a shipment of catsup which could be
discovered only by microscopic analysis. It is clear under the Code, as
under existing law, that such a limitation would be upheld and applied
if the contract had expressly made it applicable to latent defects. It would
then simply be regarded as an allocation of risk. But in the instant case,
the buyer could not reasonably be said to have been dealing with respect
to latent defects when he agreed to the very short time limitation for complaint; hence he was unfairly surprised and the contract provision can be
said to be "unconscionable" as applied to him. Thus the Uniform Commercial Code would dictate the same result as that obtained in the Utah
court, but with less judicial agonizing over the meaning of the contract
term.
As is typical of much of the Code, a number of the sections in this
Part of the Code involve a redrafting designed to clarify problems which
have proved difficult under existing law. An example is afforded by the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions which define the obligations of
35
buyer and seller in a "sale or return" or "sale on approval" transaction.
The Uniform Sales Act distinguishes between the two types of transactions
in conceptual terms; 30 the Code provides a more helpful functional distinction: if the goods are delivered primarily for use, the transaction is
treated as a sale on approval, but if the goods are delivered primarily for
33.
34.
35.
36.

1.
Uniform Commercial Code §2-302, Comment
Kansas City Vholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d
1272 (1937).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-326.
Uniform Sales Act § 19(3), WS 34-184(3).
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resale, the transaction is treated as a sale or return. The Code also makes
it clear that if the buyer in a sale on approval makes a seasonable election
to disapprove of the goods, he may return them at the seller's risk and
expense. In a sale or return transaction, on the other hand, the risk and
expense of the return is presumed to fall on the buyer.3 7 These same
provisions of the Code also make one significant change in the existing law
concerning consignment sales. The trouble with the consignment sale as
it is now used in Wyoming is that it gives the consignee a false appearance
of wealth-the merchant appears to own an inventory, where in fact he is
but a bailee. Of course, the consumer who buys from such a stock is protected, for the purpose of the consignment is to sell to him; but the creditor
of the consignee, who may rely on the appearance of wealth, cannot satisfy
himself from assets held on consignment. The Uniform Commercial Code
would reverse this rule and treat the consignment sale as a sale or return
so far as the creditors of the consignee are concerned, unless the consignee
is generally known to be dealing in the goods of others, or unless the
consignor complies with the filing requirements of Article 9 (Secured
Transactions). The change seems eminently fair to all the parties concerned; the only persons who could find any basis for complaint are merchants who plan to defraud their creditors, or distant suppliers who want
to sell on consignment, but who do not want to be troubled with our local
filing requirement even though such filing would afford our local creditors
with an opportunity to protect themselves from the fraudulent merchant.
Neither of these groups are in a position to present a very appealing case
for maintaining the present rule and the change seems clearly desirable.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this Part of the Code
is found in the provisions which re-draft the law of warranties. 3
Two
minor changes are offered: the warranty of title has been altered3 9 to drop
the superfluous covenant of quiet enjoyment 40 and add the more useful
covenant against third party claims of infringment; and the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose has been amended 4 ' to drop the exception
concerning sales "under a trade name" 42 which has been a source of considerable confusion in trying to predict the application of the existing
statute. Of course, it is still true under the Code that a plaintiff claiming
such a warranty must show that he relied on the skill of the seller in
selecting goods suitable for his purpose and evidence that the plaintiff had
asked for the goods by their trade name would be persuasive that the
necessary reliance was missing. The most important provisions concerning
warranties, however, are entirely new. One new section deals with dis37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-327.
For a more detailed discussion, see Note, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L.J. 246 (1960).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312.
Uniform Sales Act § 13(2), WS 34-178 (2).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315.
Uniform Sales Act § 15 (4), WS 34-180 (4).
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claimers of warranties/a a fertile subject of litigation in which the Uniform Sales Act gives no guidance. The approach taken by the Code is that
the parties have freedom to restrict warranties in any way they chose, but
the restriction must be plain to the buyer; the seller is not permitted to
avoid liability by stealth. This section of the Code rejects the idea that
a buyer who examines the goods must take his chances regardless of statements made by the seller. If the examination is accompanied by words
of reassurance as to the quality of the goods, and the buyer openly relies
on these words, the words give rise to an express warranty which must be
expressly disclaimed.
Another new provision is concerned with the problem of privity of
contract and warranty liability. The 18th century common law regarded
the warranty as a part of the sales contract and therefore concluded that
the seller's liability extended only to the immediate buyer. 44 The developing case law in this country, however, has taken the view that this liability
arises apart from any meeting of the minds and that the supplier who is
responsible for defective or harmful goods should be held accountable
even though the party ultimately injured was not the buyer. 45 A few
courts, principally in the east, have been confronted with claim-conscious
communities, and have perhaps been mindful that the manufacturers who
most benefited from the rule were local industries; they have remained
"bastions of privity" and have shielded the manufacturer from liability
to consumers by the use of the old common law rule. 46 Of course, it is
true that in many cases, unless an intrafamily immunity or some other
defense breaks the chain, the manufacturer or remote supplier can still be
held accountable for breach of warranty4 7 by a series of suits against
intermediate sellers, despite the privity requirement. But this is a cumbersome process, and produces many arbitrary and unfair results. The Uniform Commercial Code has sought to compromise the conflict by providing
that the seller's warranty extends, at the least, to the family, household,
and guests of his buyer who suffer personal injury. 48 This takes care of
43.
44.
45.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316.
Staurt v. Williams, I Dougl. 18 (1778).
Jacob E. Decker & Sons Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Klein
v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Curtiss Candy Co. v.
Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio
App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). The leading cases taking this view all involve impure
food, but there is not apparent reason for rejecting the privity requirement only in
such cases. But see Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382

46.

Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 RI. 51, 112 A.2d '701 (1955); Torpey
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Chysky v. Drake, 235 N.Y.
But cf. Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1
468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
N.Y.2d 884, 136 N.E.2d 715 (1956).
It should also be recalled that, in many cases, the privity requirement will not.be
imposed on a plaintiff who can establish the negligence of the manufacturer or
supplier. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Also, criminal statutes, e.g., WS 35-236, can help to bridge the privity gap. Wright
v. Carter Products, 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.

(1920).

47.

48.
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the child who eats the rotten crabmeat which his mother bought, but it is
not an altogether satisfactory solution to the problem. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming has not yet had occasion to pass on the question, so the
Code would still leave open the difficult problem of how far beyond the
family the liability extends. It would therefore seem worthwhile for the
Wyoming legislature to consider an amendment to the Code which will
resolve the problem. It seems to this writer that it would be wise to
anticipate the trend of the American case law somewhat and cast privity
to the winds.4 9 The only effective purpose which the requirement of
privity can serve in Wyoming is to protect manufacturers who sell sour
catsup or defective hay balers from liability to Wyoming consumers who
are poisoned or injured or forced to pay a big repair bill. The purpose
seems an unworthy one for Wyoming law-making, and it is therefore
suggested that Section 2-318 of the Code be amended to read:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
Performance and Breach
The Parts of Article 2 dealing with performance, breach, repudiation
and excuse from performance of the sales contract conform to the general
pattern already established. Several sections are entirely new; others are
extensions and clarifications of the existing statutes; but many present only
a simplified re-drafting of our present law. Two of the clarifications
would be especially valuable. Section 42 of the Uniform Sales Act 5o
provides simply that delivery and payment are concurrent conditions; in
other words, that both parties presumably intend to perform simultaneously. Section 47 (2),51 on the other hand, provides that the buyer is
entitled to examine the goods before accepting delivery. These two provisions are difficult to reconcile in modern commercial transactions where the
parties are a distance removed from one another. The Code provisions
shed a great deal of light on this problem by defining carefully the effect
of tender by either party52 and providing the details as to the buyer's right
of inspection. 53 A second clarification that will be very useful concerns
the ritual of acceptance of the goods; the Uniform Sales Act makes frequent
use of this concept with sometimes disjointed results. 5 4 The Uniform
Commercial Code continues the use of the term, but clearly defines the
49.
50.

Accord Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453,
150 P.2d 436 (1944).
For a more recent academic expression of a similar view,
see Whitney, The Law of Modern Commercial Practices 551 (1958).
WS 45-207.
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WS 34-212(2).

52.

Uniform
is found
P.2d 643
Uniform
Compare

53.
54.
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in Teton Auto Co. v. Northwestern Pure Bred Sow Co., 48 Wyo. 478, 49
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consequences of acceptance 5 and provides for the revocation of an acceptance. 5 6 In this last-mentioned section, the Code abandons the term "recission" which has been a source of considerable confusion during the life
of the Uniform Sales Act.
The substantive changes which would be effected by the Code serve
several entirely uncontroversial purposes. Some of the changes are intended to reduce the opportunities for one party to a commercial contract
to take advantage of legal technicalities to the prejudice of the rights
of the other. Thus a seller is given an opportunity to cure an improper
tender or delivery if he reasonably believed that the goods delivered or
tendered would be acceptable to the buyer. 5
Fair-dealing is similarly
promoted by a new section which imposes upon the buyer, under certain
circumstances, a duty to particularize his objections to the goods, upon
pain of waiving his claim of defective performance. 58
Other provisions are intended to reduce the amount in controversy
when a dispute arises between buyer and seller by providing for an orderly
distribution of the goods. Thus, a buyer is authorized, where practicable,
to accept partipl performance without prejudice to his rights with respect
to the remaining breach 59, and a buyer who rightfully rejects goods is
required nevertheless to assume some responsibility for their disposition if
the seller is not reasonably able to protect himself; 60 further, any buyer
is given the right to salvage the value of the goods for the seller's account,
61
if he chooses to do so and the seller provides no contrary instructions.
Likewise, the Code provides for the preservation of evidence of goods in
dispute, 62 thereby promoting certainty as to the condition of the goods
and reducing uncertainty in litigation. All of these provisions should
have the effect of confining the dispute to the narrowest possible limits
and thereby encouraging settlement and the continuation of harmonious
commercial relationships.
Still other changes are intended to give greater assurance to the parties
to commercial agreements that they are contracting to secure a performance of the agreement and not an interest (even a valuable one) in litigation. Thus, a buyer who has made payment and acquired an interest in
identified goods may recover them even though the seller is insolvent,
if the insolvency occurs within ten days after receipt of payment.63 And
both parties are given the right, if reasonable grounds for insecurity arise,
to insist upon adequate assuranec of performance and suspend perform64
ance for which they have not already received the agreed return.
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Remedies on Default
The Part of Article 2 dealing with remedies is true to the pattern
established in the preceding Parts; a few substantive changes are made
in existing law which bear mention. The most important of these changes
would serve the purpose of reducing the amounts involved in commercial
controversies by encouraging the parties to fix the measure of recovery
for default by proceeding in a commercially reasonable manner. Thus,
the buyer is authorized to fix the measure of his recovery for the failure
of the seller to deliver by means of "cover." 6 .1 If he proceeds reasonably,
he is entitled thereafter to recover the difference between the contract
price and the price of the "covering" goods he acquires from another seller
and he need not be concerned with proving (as he must under the Uniform
Sales Act) 88 the market price at the time and place of default. This is
much fairer to the buyer and should encourage amicable settlements since
it removes the question of damages from the area of dispute. The same
purpose is served by the Code provisions dealing with the sellers remedy
in fixing the measure of his recovery against a defaulting buyer by a resale
of the goods to another buyer. This is, of course, permitted under existing
law, 6 7 but the Code expands its use by restricting the seller's alternative
right to treat the goods as the property of the buyer and maintain an action
for the price. 68 Under the Uniform Sales Act, the seller may recover
the price of the goods if title has passed, or if the price is payable on a
"day certain," or if the goods are not readily resalable.8 0 The Code provision limits this remedy to cases where the goods are not readily resalable, except where the buyer has accepted the goods or where they have
been destroyed after risk of loss has passed. As presently used under the
Uniform Sales Act, the recovery of the price can be an unnecessary oppression to the defaulting buyer since it tends to relieve the seller in possession
of the goods of any economic interest in efficient resale. By restricting the
price remedy, the Uniform Commercial Code effectively encourages the
seller to fix the defaulting buyer's liability fairly and quickly by reasonable
resale.
Other changes effected by this Part of Article 2 would remove some
of the technical limitations on the remedies of aggrieved buyers and sellers.
One section 70 extends the seller's right to stop delivery to the buyer. At
present, that right is restricted to situations where the goods are in the
hands of a carrier and the buyer is insolvent. The Code extends this
remedy to cover other circumstances, although the right to stop for reasons
other than insolvency is limited to carload, truckload, planeload or larger
shipments. Another section 71 extends the buyer's right to specific per65.
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formance beyond the present technical requirement that the contract thus
enforced pertain to specific or ascertained goods 72 and encourages courts
to look beyond the traditional test of uniqueness to find other situations
which justify the exercise of their discretionary power. Still another new
section 73 is designed to mitigate the rigors of existing technicalities pertaining to the election of remedies. Under the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer
who accepts a tender of a substitution of other goods for defective goods
has been held to have lost his right to recover damages resulting from the
breach, because he has "rescinded" the original agreement and may not
accumulate his remedies.7 4 The Code provision would reverse the rule of
construction which produces this unfair result.
The Uniform Commercial Code provision dealing with liquidation of
damages 75 is largely declaratory of existing common law, although it would
appear to overrule the old Wyoming case of Ivinson & Co. v. Althrop,76
which seems to hold that any contract provision which describes itself as a
liquidation of damages will be enforced without regard to the reasonableness of the liquidation. This section does also add one new feature which
provides the defaulting buyer with a right to restitution of payments
exceeding 20% of the price or $500, whichever is smaller, subject to the
seller's right to damages or restitution for benefits conferred. This provision will not enjoy frequent application, but it is a desirable limitation
on excessive forfeitures which can now result in cases where the defaulting
buyer encounters the rule that a contract breaker is not entitled to restitu77
tion.
Reflection on the foregoing analysis compels the conclusion that
Article 2 is a substantial improvement on the Uniform Sales Act; while
it will not significantly alter the ultimate result in most commercial disputes, it should ease the path to peaceful solution, and may, by providing
greater certainty in the application of the rules, prevent many such disputes from arising.
Article 6-Bulk Sales
Although the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have never
before proposed a uniform act dealing with bulk sales, every state has
adopted some legislation on the subject. Such statutes are intended to
protect unsecured creditors of merchants who might be disposed to strip
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

Uniform Sales Act § 68, WS 34-233.
Uniform Commercial Code 1 2-720.
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themselves of assets or liquidate inventory and fixtures and abscond with
the proceeds. The Wyoming Bulk Sales Law is typical in that it declares
a bulk sale of inventory or fixtures, outside the regular course of business,
to be presumptively fraudulent and therefore void as to the creditors of
the seller unless the buyer secures from the seller a list of the creditors
and notifies each five days in advance of the impending sale.7 8 Many of
the existing bulk sales laws are inadequate and it has long been thought
desirable to secure greater uniformity between states, and the sponsors
therefore deemed it desirable to include a bulk sales law at Article 6 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
The existing Wyoming law is so cryptic that it is a wonder that
merchants and lawyers have been able to live with it for fifty years. Article
6 would be a tremendous improvement in two respects. First, it would
limit the application of the bulk sales law to situations in which it really
serves its intended purpose. It should be recognized that compliance with
the law is a great nuisance to buyers and sellers of goods; the drafters of the
Code took the view that they should not be burdened with this nuisance
unless the creditors of the seller have a real interest to be protected and
they have accordingly limited the application of the bulk sales law requirements. Also, Article 6 resolves many questions which are left open
by the existing Wyoming law which must some day give trouble, unless
the answers are provided.
Most of the limitations on the application of Article 6 are found in
one section which lists eight kinds of transfers which are excepted. Only
two of these exceptions are authorized by the existing Wyoming statute, 79
although others might perhaps be created by judicial construction consistently with the apparent purpose of the law. Transfers which would be
specifically excepted are bulk mortgages,8 0 general assignments for the
benefit of creditors,' transfers to buyers who assume the debts of the
seller,8 2 transfers arising out of a reorganization of the business, 88 and
transfers of property which is exempt from execution.8 4 Perhaps the most
important limitation on the application of Article 6 is, however, to be found
in the provision which makes the Article applicable only to sellers whose
principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those
who manufacture what they sell. s5 This excludes application to sellers
who are primarily engaged in the sale of services; the view of the drafters
of Article 6 was that creditors who lend to farmers, barbers, restaurants,
and the like, are not relying on a stock of merchandise or fixtures to satisfy
78.
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their claim and that there is therefore no reason to compel compliance
with the bulk sales law when such a seller disposes of his fixtures. The
Code does appear to extend the application of the bulk sales law in one
respect by providing for compliance in sales by attction.86 It would be
difficult to apply the existing law to such sales, despite the fact that an
auction would be a very satisfactory, if not a likely, way for a merchant
seller to achieve the objectives which are intended to be forbidden by the
bulk sales law. The new provision dealing with auctions is therefore
plainly desirable.
Article 6 fills in a number of different kinds of details. Perhaps most
important are the provisions detailing the method of compliance. 8 7 These
provisions do, however, raise two questions which must be decided for
Wyoming. The existing Wyoming statute provides that the creditors
must be given five days advance notice of the sale; the Code extends the
period to ten days.8 8 The Official Comment expains that the purpose of
the law is to permit the creditors to determine before, rather than after,
whether they should try to stop a proposed sale. "To be effective, it requires a longer notice than five days." 89 This writer is disposed to dispute
this assertion; if the parties to the sale comply with the detailed notice
requirements, the creditor should have an adequate basis for decision as to
whether he should oppose the sale or attempt to impound the proceeds
in some way. The extension of the notice period to ten days therefore
seems to impose anunnecessary burden of delay on the buyer and seller.
This is a question on which the persons affected should be consulted, but
it would seem appropriate to consider preservation of the five day notice
period presently prevailing in Wyoming. A second question is raised by
optional provisions which would adopt the so-called "Pennsylvania
rule" which imposes on the buyer the burden of actually paying the debts
listed by the seller; this seems unnecessary and unwise and is at odds with
the prevailing practice in most states. Wyoming should follow the lead
of states other than Pennsylvania which have adopted the Code, and reject
the optional provisions of Article 6.
The Code is also more specific in defining the consequences of noncompliance, particularly with reference to subsequent transfers of the
property by the bulk buyer. The Code provision provides that a good
faith purchaser for value takes free of the defect in the title of his transferor which arises from previous non-compliance with the bulk sales law.90
One basic change is made in the consequences of non-compliance: under
existing law, non-compliance creates a presumption of fraud which can be
overcome -if the buyer establishes, his good faith in the transaction, 1
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while the Code would make the transfer ineffective against the creditors
without regard to the good faith of the non-complying buyer.92 The
present rule serves no useful purpose since no buyer can reasonably rely
on being able to satisfactorily demonstrate his good faith; the effort of
the rule is simply to add an element of risk in the enforcement of the law.
The Code also clarifies two other troublesome problems in resolving tile
choice of law question ifi favor of the law of the place where the goods
are located at the time of the transfer 9 3 and by providing a six month
limitation on actions or levies of aggrieved creditors. 94 It is not clear
under existing law which limitation, if any, is applicable in such cases.
The short period imposed by the Code seems reasonable for it is very
unlikely that a creditor who delays for more than six months is placing
much reliance on the goods sold in extending creditor to the transferor.
Subject to the question raised concerning the proper period of notice
to be required, it seems plain that Article 6 would be very beneficial to
everyone concerned with bulk sales transactions in Wyoming. It offers a
great improvement in simplicity and certainty over the existing law. 95
Article 7-Documents of Title
This Article is concerned with bills of lading and warehouse receipts
and would replace the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 96 five sections
of the Wyoming Statutes which deal with bills of lading, 97 and fourteen
sections of the Uniform Sales Act which pertain to documents of title. 98
For reasons which now seem lost to mind, Wyoming never adopted the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act, which would be displaced by the Code in
most states.
Perhaps the reason that this Act was not adopted is its lack of importance in Wyoming. The rights of the parties to bills of lading which are
issued in the course of interstate commerce are governed by the Federal
Bills of Lading Act 99 and the Intertsate Commerce Act;' 00 inasmuch as
it is a rare transaction which produces a contract of carriage of goods
between two places in Wyoming, the local law of bills of lading has few
occasions for application. It is nevertheless true that insofar as the present
Wyoming law pertaining to such bills has application, it is quite thoroughly unsatisfactory. The Chapter of the Wyoming statutes dealing with bills
of lading contains eight sections; of these, only five deal with matters
covered by the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and Article 7, and these
compare with fifty-seven sections in the Uniform Law. These five sections
92.
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are much too skimpy to. provide guidance for the solution of most of the
problems arising out of the issuance of bills of lading. Furthermore, most
of the provisions of these five sections are affirmatively undesirable. Two
of them are concerned with the carrier's responsibility for the issuance
of false or duplicate documents. 10 A purchaser of a bill of lading relies
upon the carrier's representation that the goods described are in transit;
if the document was issued before the carrier received the goods, or if the
bill is a duplicate and not clearly marked as such. this reliance is misplaced. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act quite reasonably places liability
on the carrier in such a case.' 0 2 This is probably declaratory of the
common law. But the existing Wyoming statute simply declares the
conduct of the carrier in issuing such a false bill to be criminal.' 0 3 This
casts considerable doubt on the carrier's just civil liability: it is possible
to argue that if the legislature intended that the carrier should suffer
civil liability, it would not have imposed the criminal sanction for, if the
carrier is liable, then the only person hurt by the carrier's conduct is the
carrier itself. In such circumstances, the criminal liability would not
seem appropriate. It must surely be granted that the denial of civil
liability would be an outrage and that the Uniform Commercial Code
provision' 0 ' which would prevent the possibility of such an occurrence is
very welcome. Still another defect which appears in the same Wyoming
statute is the failure to impose any liability on the carrier for misdescriptions of the goods in the bill. The Uniform Commercial Code would
clear this up and also provide in some detail for the carrier's disclaimer
of responsibility for the description, as where the goods are shipped
"seller's load and count."' 0 5
Another unfortunate feature of the existing statutes concerns lost bills
of lading. The Wyoming statute provides that the carrier may surrender
goods shipped under an order bill only if the bill is surrendered, or the
recipient posts bond for double the value of the property.' 0 e If one of these
conditions is not met, delivery by the carrier is a crime. This is entirely
too inflexible; not even a court, much less a willing carrier, can relax
these requirements, which seem quite stiff, especially in light of the difficulty of finding an available surety. The Uniform Commercial Code
would afford some leeway in handling the problem and would have the
salutary effect of clearing the premises of unnecessary and unenforced
07
criminal provisions.1
Two Code sections dealing with bills of lading are clearly changes
in the existing, unwritten Wyoming law. One of these authorizes the
101.
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carrier to issue the bill of lading at destination when requested to do so
by the consignor;10s this will be a convenient change in transactions involving air or truck transport which may permit delivery of the goods
before the documents could reach the consignee by mail. Another extends
the carrier's lien to stolen goods in cases where the carrier is by law required to receive them and has no notice that the consignor lacks authority
to ship them.109 This seems more reasonable than the existing contrary
rule which often produces unjust enrichment of the owner and hardship on
the carrier. A similar provision preserves the warehouseman's lien, except
that the warehouseman's lien applies to stolen goods only if the owner
entrusted the goods to the bailor."10
One change would be made in the rules peculiar to warehouse receipts. This protects the buyer in ordinary course of fungible goods sold
by a warehouseman who is a dealer in such goods; such a buyer takes free
of any claim under an outstanding warehouse receipt." 1 As the Official
Comment explains, the practical difficulty of tracing fungible goods means
that the imposition of the risk on the good faith purchaser adds little to
the value of the receipt. Also, the receipt holder is still in a position to
share in the fungible goods remaining in the warehouse, whereas the good
faith purchaser is reduced, under the present rule, to the status of a
general creditor of an insolvent warehouseman. The right of the receipt
holder to such a share is assured by another section of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1 2 which expressly provides for distribution of short
goods to all holders of overissued receipts.
Finally, two changes are proposed which relate to the rights of holders
of documents of title (either bills of lading or warehouse receipts). First,
the transferee is assured of the right to have a transferor supply a missing,
without regard for the present requirement that
necessary indorsement'
the transferee must be a holder "for value.""1 4 The old rules of consideration have no place in this question and the change is very minor, but
welcome. More importantly, the Uniform Commercial Code narrows
the class of persons accorded the status of good faith purchasers, and
broadens the rights of the remaining class. The old Uniform Act protects
the good faith purchaser of a bill of lading running to bearer, even if he
acquires the bill from a thief."15 This may not be true under the common
law rules pertaining in Wyoming. And, under the existing statute, it is
not true for the good faith purchaser of a warehouse receipt; the trans108. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-305.
109. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-307. Cf., Swinson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 117
Kan. 258, 230 Pac. 140 (1923).
110. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-209. Compare Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
§ 28 (b), WS 34-346 (b).
I11. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-205.
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feree of a warehouse receipt acquires no better title than his transferor
unless the latter has been entrusted with possession by the owner 110 The
Uniform Commercial Code protects the innocent purchaser of any bearer
document against this risk."' 7 But, in doing so, the Code raises the existing standards of innocence: the claim to good faith is defeated if the
negotiation of the document is not in the regular course of business or
financing or involves receiving the document in settlement or payment
of a money obligation."" With respect to this latter change, the Official
Comment explains that no commercial purpose is served by allowing a
tramp or a professor to "duly negotiate" a document for hides or cotton
not his own.
In addition to these rather minor changes in existing law, the Uniform
Commercial Code would clarify a number of problems which are presently
troublesome. Under existing law, neither a carrier" 19 nor a warehouseman 1 -0 may relieve himself of responsibility for his own negligence by
agreement of the bailor. This rule raises some question about the validity
of binding declarations which undervalue the goods. It is beneficial to all
parties to give effect to such limitations on claims, for otherwise the bailor
who is otherwise adequately insured against loss is forced to pay a second
price for protection. The Code makes it clear that such declarations may
be given effect. 12' Another difficulty with exiting statutes is their failure
to make clear who can give a carrier effective instructions for reconsignment or to provide a simple statement of the bailee's obligation on the
document. Obsurity is now afforded by overlapping provisions in the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act dealing with the warehouseman's obligation to deliver, his justification in delivering, and his liability for misdelivery.' 22 The Uniform Commercial Code remedies this defect.' 23 Also
clarified is the course of action to be followed by a bailee who is confronted with conflicting claims to goods in his possession."24 And, also
worthy of mention, is a new provision which defines the warranties made
by a bank when it makes delivery of a document of title in the course
of making a collection for the seller in a documentary transaction.12 5
It is doubtless apparent to the reader that the changes which Article 7
would make in present Wyoming statutes are mostly trivial. The advan116. Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act §§ 40, 47, WS 34-358 and WS 34-365. At the
suggestion of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, made in 1922, many
states amended the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act to conform to the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act rule, Wyoming did not.
117. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-501 (1).
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124. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-603.
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tage to be gained from enactment of this portion of the Uniform Commercial Code must therefore be found in the fact that the Code is a much
more thorough and painstaking drafting job. This is especially true with
reference to our bills of lading laws, but it is also significant with
reference to our Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.

